Introduction
During the last two decades, there has been a significant increase in anti-dumping (AD) activity in the world economy. Prusa (2005) documents that the number of anti-dumping cases filed with the WTO tripled between the early 1980s and the late 1990s. Also, while two decades ago the overwhelming majority of AD cases was filed by the United States, the European Union, Canada and Australia, today India, Argentina, Mexico, Brazil, South Africa and New Zealand are additional heavy users. Figures from Zanardi (2004) show that 46 countries adopted AD laws between 1990 and 2001, which may yet lead to a further increase in anti-dumping activity in the near future.
The empirical literature on anti-dumping has traditionally focused on aggregate issues like changes in international equilibrium prices (Debaere, 2005; Prusa, 1997) , pass-through to domestic prices (Blonigen and Haynes, 2002; Blonigen and Park, 2004) , changes in trade volumes, trade deflection and trade depression (Bown and Crowley, 2007a; Staiger and Wolak, 1994; Prusa, 1997) , impacts on aggregate welfare costs (Gallaway, Blonigen and Flynn, 1999) , and retaliation and further trade liberalization (Blonigen and Bown, 2003) .
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In this paper, we are instead interested in exploring household adjustments to trade policy, in particular to anti-dumping measures. In light of the increasingly heavy use of AD, our estimates of these microeconomic impacts should become valuable additions to the set of current evaluations of AD policies.
We study the anti-dumping duties imposed by the United States on imports of catfish fillets from Vietnam in 2003. After the U.S. lifted the embargo on Vietnam in 1994, Vietnamese catfish burst into the U.S. market, which by 2002 became the main export destination and accounted for 50 percent of total production. However, while catfish farming is an important source of income for households in the Mekong delta in Southern Vietnam, it is also an important industry in the Southern United States (mainly in Mississippi, Arkansas, Alabama, and Louisiana). Faced with this increasing competition from cheaper Vietnamese catfish, the Association of Catfish Farmers of America (CFA) initiated a successful campaign to halt catfish imports. First, the CFA pursued a labeling campaign whereby Vietnamese products were forced to be sold as 'tra' and 'basa,' a different product from the American 'channel' catfish. Later, the CFA launched dumping allegations. In January 2003, the U.S. Department of Commerce (DoC) ruled in favor of the dumping claim of the CFA and established tariffs ranging from 37 to 64 percent on imports of frozen catfish (that is, tra and basa) from Vietnam. In July 2003, the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) ratified the DoC ruling. As a result, Vietnamese exports of catfish to the U.S. plummeted to the point of being almost completely shut down.
Our objective in this paper is to explore patterns of household adjustment to this AD shock among Mekong farmers in Vietnam. In world markets where export barriers abound (sometimes intertwined with export preferences), one of the main concerns with the trade policies of developed countries is how such policies affect welfare in trade partners in the developing world. For this reason, we focus here on adjustments in the process of generation of household income. We first establish the overall response of household income to the U.S. AD policy among catfish farmers in the Mekong. We also document how income adjustment takes place and whether there are intrahousehold spillovers from the activities directly affected by the trade shocks (catfish in our case) to other household occupations (like agriculture). To do this, we investigate whether the U.S. policy triggered exit out of catfish farming and into various other occupations, we establish whether there was an impact on the level of various sources of household income, and we inspect household adjustments in input decisions such as labor supply and investment in non-catfish activities.
Our identification strategy is based on the comparison of household outcomes before and after the U.S. AD intervention across catfish farmers with different levels of exposure to the shock. The Vietnamese catfish case is ideal for ex-post analysis. First, the 2003 U.S. decision is a trade shock which is arguably exogenous with respect to decisions taken by analyze ex-post the impact of trade policies on household income and production decisions. Edmonds and Pavcnik (2005) find that the increase in the price of rice that followed market integration in Vietnam led to declines in child labor, especially in households that were large net producers of rice. Topalova (2005) studies the impact on poverty and inequality of trade liberalization in India in the early 1990s. She finds that rural areas with industries more exposed to liberalization experienced less poverty reduction. Edmonds, Pavcnik, and Topalova (2007) analyze the impact of the same liberalization process on human capital investment. They find that areas with more concentration of protected industries saw a lower increase in schooling and a lower decline in child labor. McGaig (2008) Our findings are as follows. We find that larger farmers suffered significantly larger losses than smaller ones, even in relative terms. The average catfish farmer faced an 11.3 percent decline in income relative to households with only marginal involvement in catfish production. However, while low-exposure farmers faced relative income losses of 6.2 percent the relative decline was 16.9 percent for high-exposure farmers.
2 The anti-dumping shock triggered significant exit out of catfish farming. On the one hand, the share of income derived from catfish farming decreased to a larger extent for those households heavily involved in aquaculture. On the other hand, full exit out of catfish was much more likely at low levels of exposure. Households adjusted by moving out of catfish aquaculture and into wage labor markets and agriculture (and not into other aquaculture activities like shrimp or mollusks, for instance). Moreover, we find evidence of adjustments costs and of spillovers into non-aquaculture household economic activities, with non-catfish income suffering relative declines as well. Also, not only investment in aquaculture declined, as expected, but aggregate investment in non-catfish activities declined as well. Overall, thus, our evidence is consistent with externalities, at the farm level, from catfish to non-catfish farming. These spillovers mostly affected activities such as animal husbandry, farm services, or silviculture, while leaving hours worked off-farm and investment in agriculture unchanged.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we illustrate the timeline of the U.S. anti-dumping measures on Vietnamese catfish. In section 3, we describe the production of catfish in Vietnam and we characterize the catfish farmers of the Mekong delta. In section 4, we document the changes in household income and the pattern of household adjustment to the trade shock. Section 5 concludes.
The US anti-dumping Ruling on Vietnamese Catfish
Catfish is a fresh-water fish that thrives in large, flat rivers. In the U.S., catfish is raised in man-made ponds mainly in the states of Mississippi, Arkansas, Alabama, and Louisiana. The Hau and Tien rivers in the Mekong region of South Vietnam also provide a good habitat for catfish. The Vietnamese varieties, known as basa and tra, are raised by small farmers in cages that are placed in the river itself and later processed in industrialized plants.
While tra is of lower quality than basa in terms of flavor and texture, it is faster, easier, and less costly to raise and has become the most popular of the two species among Mekong producers.
In 1995, soon after the end of the U.S. embargo, Vietnam started exporting frozen fillets of basa and tra to the U.S. market. 4 As a first effort to popularize the Vietnamese products, more appealing names such as River Cobbler and China Sole were used to market the fish.
Later on, retailers labeled basa and tra simply as catfish. They also adopted brand names that suggested a Mississippi-raised origin, such as Cajun Delight Catfish, and used packaging similar to the American channel catfish. did not lead to a significant recovery in prices. While public awareness increased, most Vietnamese catfish was being sold to American wholesale distributors, not final consumers, and a change in names was not enough to break the commercial networks that had already been established.
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In June 2002, the CFA filed a dumping lawsuit against Vietnam. A few months later, in January 2003, the U.S. DoC ruled in favor of U.S. farmers, arguing that Vietnamese exporters were dumping frozen fish fillets on U.S. markets by margins that varied by exporter and ranged from 37 to 64 percent of the "normal value."
7 When the exporting country is a "market economy," the DoC determines the normal value of an imported product using either the domestic price or an estimate of the cost of production in the country of origin.
Vietnam, however, is considered as a "non-market economy" by the U.S. government, which implies the presumption that domestic prices are distorted. As a consequence, prices and costs in a surrogate country are used instead. In the case of Vietnamese catfish, the surrogate countries used by the DoC were Bangladesh and India. As the last step of the lawsuit, in July 2003, the USITC found that American catfish processors were materially injured by imports from Vietnam, confirming the application of anti-dumping import tax rates equivalent to the dumping margins of 37 to 64 percent. 8 The USITC decided to exclude American catfish farmers from the investigation on material injury, and focused only on catfish processors. The argument was that the percentage of unprocessed domestic farm-raised catfish that was used as input for frozen fillets, which was about 50 percent, was not high enough. Clearly, the catfish habitat is concentrated in the provinces more heavily touched by the Mekong River. on provincial production for the 6 major producers. The main producers of tra and basa in 2003 were An Giang, which accounted for 40.2 percent of total production, Dong Thap (15.8 percent) and Can Tho (35.5 percent). While Vinh Long and Tien Giang were relatively specialized in catfish, Soc Trang appeared to be only a marginal producer. All other provinces produced very little (around 1.6 percent) of tra and basa in that year.
11 Overall, these data confirm that catfish is indeed mostly produced in landlocked Mekong provinces.
In light of this evidence, our analysis focuses on the six 'catfish provinces' identified above, which we aggregate into two samples. Our core sample, which we call Mekong 4 (M4), comprises the landlocked provinces that almost fully specialize in catfish freshwater aquaculture, namely An Giang, Can Tho, Dong Thap and Vinh Long. For robustness, we also explore results using an alternative sample, which we call Mekong 6 (M6), that adds the provinces of Soc Trang and Tien Giang. These two latter provinces are also engaged in catfish but are diversified into brackish and marine aquaculture as well.
The Household Survey Data
For The VHLSSs comprise several modules with information on demographics, education, employment, health, income and labor supply. There is also an expenditure module, which was however used only for a subsample of the interviewed households, 29,000 in VHLSS'02 and 9,000 in VHLSS'04. In practice, the expenditure module is not usable for our purposes because there are only a few dozen observations in the panel sample of aquaculture households in our focus Mekong provinces. Extensive modules record information on farm activities related to agriculture, livestock and aquaculture. Data include production, sales, input use and investment. The information on aquaculture activities distinguishes between raising and catching fish, shrimp, or all other aquaculture products (like mollusks). It must be emphasized that the data do not explicitly separate catfish from more general fish production.
Hence, although in the rest of the paper we will refer to 'catfish income' and to 'catfish households', these are, strictly speaking, 'fish income' and 'fish households'. At the same time, we have shown that in the regions relevant for our analysis catfish represents a preponderant fraction of total catfish production, especially for M4 provinces.
Sample sizes and income levels on the panel sample are reported in Table 3 . Panels A) and B) refer to households in the Mekong Delta in the target samples M4 and M6; Panel C) includes information on South Vietnam (excluding the Mekong), for comparison purposes.
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The columns refer to fishing households, non-fishing rural households, and all households in the data, for both 2002 and 2004. Catfish production is widespread in the Mekong. There are 561 and 788 catfish households in the M4 and M6 panel samples, respectively. This is around half of the overall sample in the region and close to 60 percent of the total rural sample (more concretely, 63 percent in M4 and 56 percent in M6). These catfish households are the relevant population exposed to the AD shock on which we base our analysis. For each of the M4, M6, and South Vietnam (non-Mekong) regions, and for each set of households (fishing, rural, all), we report in Table 3 the AD shock to catfish income, there is sizeable growth in total per capita income in the Mekong. These growth rates are, however, slightly lower than the average growth rate in pci at the national level based on VHLSS data. Catfish households are relatively better-off than the rest of the households in the Mekong. For instance, in 2002, the median pci of fishing households was around 27 percent higher than among non-fishing rural households and 8 percent higher than the overall median in the Mekong. Finally, an interesting results is that the median pci in both M4 and M6 is roughly the same as in the rest of South Vietnam.
To present an overview of the sources of income in the region, we report in Table 4 the share of income derived from different economic activities in the two target samples M4 and M6. Catfish households rarely specialize in fishing and are instead diversified into various economic activities, including wage labor, agriculture (both for sale in the market and for home consumption) and livestock (including poultry). At the same time, these households were only marginally involved in other aquaculture activities, such as shrimp or marine fishing. An important conclusion that emerges from Table 4 
anti-dumping Shock and Household Adjustments
In this section, we investigate whether households in the Mekong were affected by the U.S.
anti-dumping shock. Specifically, our emphasis is in documenting the effects of the AD on the process of income generation of the household.
In order to illustrate the focus of our analysis and to clarify our empirical strategy, we introduce first a simple graphical illustration of the impact of the shock. We assume that a household h is engaged in two economic activities so that household income y h is composed of catfish income, y c h , and agricultural income, y a h . We assume for simplicity that, in the initial situation before the AD shock, each household is endowed with fixed quantities of capital and laborK h andL h . We also assume that inputs cannot be traded, so that the 14 household's production problem is to maximize revenues (since production efficiency is a necessary condition for utility maximization).
14 Catfish income is the product of catfish farm-gate prices, p c and catfish production, q c h . Similarly, agricultural income is the product of agricultural prices p a and quantities q a h . Household income is then given by
where
h denote the quantities of labor and capital allocated to the production of good i, i = a, c. At any point in time, the (fixed) inputs available to the household (capital, labor, etc.) define a production possibility frontier, represented by the curve ca, between catfish (denoted with c in the horizontal axis) and agriculture (denoted with a in the vertical axis). For given prices, efficiency in production requires tangency between the relative prices and the slope of this frontier. We assume that p 1 is the initial relative price of catfish and that, before the imposition of the tariff, inputs are allocated optimally, so that production is at point q 1 .
The imposition of AD duties implies an exogenous change in the relative price of catfish.
Keeping everything else constant, optimality requires tangency between the frontier ca and the new price vector. In Figure 3 , when catfish prices decline to p 2 , production allocation would shift to q 2 . To study the welfare consequences of such a price change, differentiate (1) as follows:
(2) dy h = dp
In a first best situation, and for a small price change, the last two terms cancel out because, with efficiency in production, dq
In such case, the welfare analysis can be based on the following first order approximation, popularized by Deaton (1989) :
h dp c . Note: q 1 is the initial allocation. After a drop in catfish prices, q 2 would represent the first best allocation. Instead, with adjustments costs and spillovers in both aquaculture and agriculture, the equilibrium is q 2 .
Figure 3 Household Production With Adjustment Costs and Spillovers
This result follows from the envelope theorem: in an optimum, the resources released from the contraction of catfish activities cannot become idle and must be employed in agriculture.
While the result holds for a sufficiently small price change, even with larger price changes a typical second order approximation is ordinarily (but not necessarily) small (the standard Harberger triangles).
There are various scenarios where the first order approximation in (3) can become inaccurate. In developing countries, distortions resulting from subsidies or taxes, or from the presence of missing markets in products, inputs, credit and insurance, are very common.
Missing markets prevent the realization of the first best by affecting the shadow prices faced by the household (de Janvry, Fafchamps and Sadoulet, 1991) . Another source of departure from the first order approximation is what we will refer to as "adjustment costs." Adjustment costs arise when the reallocation of resources from one activity to another (following a price change for instance) is costly. For example, know-how and other production inputs may be activity-specific, or start-up financing costs coupled with imperfections in credit markets may limit the ability to change the input allocation. Another scenario where the first order approximation may fail is when there are market imperfections that generate "intrahousehold spillovers," that is, when a decline in catfish prices not only affects the production of aquaculture but also of other household activities through externalities. For instance, if cash income earned for catfish sales is needed to finance investment, and if credit markets are imperfect, changes in catfish prices may affect input choices and then restrict the production possibilities in one or more seasons following the negative price shock.
Graphically, we can visualize the extent of the failure of the first order approximation by allowing the production frontier to shrink after the decline in catfish prices. This shift in the frontier represents the loss of resources due to costs of adjustment as well as due to spillovers in investment (possibly both in catfish and in agriculture). Our argument adapts the analysis in Atkinson and Stern (1974) -where taxation needed to provide a public good produces inefficiencies that shrink the production frontier-to a household production model.
In Figure 3 , the frontier shifts to c a and, at changed prices p 2 , the optimal allocation point q 2 is not feasible. With adjustment costs and intrahousehold spillovers, the equilibrium is instead at a point such as q 2 , an allocation characterized by declines in total income as well as in catfish and agricultural production.
We can also formalize this argument as follows. Suppose that the initial allocation of labor and capital is such that at initial prices p 1 the equilibrium q 1 is achieved. Instead of laying out a full dynamic model of household investment and production with adjustment costs and spillovers, we assume that the total amount of capital,K h , available to the farmer during the following season is a negative function of catfish prices. This simple idea formalizes the notion that when catfish prices decline, there is a loss of capital in the adjustment process from catfish to agriculture as well as lower overall investment. Differentiating (1) with respect to p c , we get (4) dy h = dp
where we now allow price changes dp c h to differ across households. The proportional change in household income is
where s c h is the income share derived from catfish production and
is the elasticity of the output of good i (catfish or agriculture) to the total capital stock of the household. 15 Notice that while (3) is an approximation to the change in welfare (real income) due to higher catfish prices, (5) is not because it does not take into account to cost of capital K. Our argument is that, in our setting, the loss of income can be higher than the savings in factor costs so that the decline in catfish prices can generate welfare losses beyond those captured by (3).
There are several insights from (5) that are useful for our empirical approach.
First, the presence of adjustments costs implies the presence of the second term
d lnK h in the first order approximation (5), which can be sizeable.
Second, the impact of the price change due to the AD policy should be expected to be heterogeneous across farmers and to depend on the exposure to the shock, measured in equation (5) 
Empirical Strategy
In all our estimated regressions, we use only data from households involved in fish farming and residing in one of the provinces of the Mekong regions where catfish production is concentrated (the M4 and M6 samples defined above). In the absence of a randomized experiment, it is hard to find a suitable control group for catfish Mekong producers.
Non-aquaculture households in the target samples are not suitable controls because of the likely self-selection into different economic activities. Also, non-aquaculture households may have been hit indirectly by the AD measure through general equilibrium effects. Aquaculture households in the rest of Vietnam are not a good control group either. On the one hand, the vast differences in trends and in recent history between North and South Vietnam prevent using the Red River delta region as a control. On the other hand, the non-Mekong South specializes in brackish and marine aquaculture, especially shrimp farming, and these activities are likely exposed to different trends relative to catfish farming. Our estimation strategy thus relies on comparing household outcomes before and after the introduction of the U.S. AD duties across households with different levels of exposure to the shock. Concretely, let Y h be one of the outcomes that we explore below (income, income shares, sources of income, and input choices). We study the following model for the change in outcomes, Note: non-parametric estimates of the density of catfish income shares in 2002 using a Gaussian Kernel and the standard optimal bandwidth. The sample is M4, the Mekong provinces of An Giang, Can Tho, Dong Tha, and Tra Vinh. The vertical lines represent the median catfish share (the leftmost line), the mean share (the centerline) and the median share, conditional on producing more than the mean (the rightmost line).
Kernel methods, for sample M4 (the landlocked Mekong provinces of An Giang, Can Tho, Dong Tha, and Tra Vinh). The distribution of catfish shares is clearly unimodal and right-skewed. The mode is close to 0.025, while mean and median are respectively 5.5 and 11.2 percent.
The Impact on Household Income
We first estimate the impact of the AD shock on household income, using model (6).
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We present separate results for total and per capita household income-measured including earnings from all economic activities, including home production and transfers-and for net income, which is calculated subtracting from total income the cost of inputs in farm activities (see Appendix 1 for details). Our basic specification adopts a quadratic polynomial on the initial shares to estimate g(·). For robustness, we also estimate a more general and flexible partially linear semi-parametric model as in Robinson (1988) .
To reveal different AD effects at different levels of exposure, we evaluate the estimated impact function g(·) for different values of s h . For households in M4, we define three levels of exposure: low, at a level equal to the median share (5.5 percent); medium, at the mean level equal to 11.2 percent; high, for a level equal to the median share among farmers above the sample mean (a value close to 20 percent). The corresponding figures for M6, the extended Mekong catfish provinces (adding Sac Trong and Tien Giang) are 4.4 percent, 9.6 percent, and 16.9 percent respectively.
Results from our regressions are in Table 5 . We report the impact on total household income for the M4 sample in column (1) and for the M6 sample in column (2). The corresponding results for per capita household income are in columns (3) and (4) and, for net income, in columns (5) and (6). Panel A) shows the estimates from the quadratic model. All our estimates, in both samples and for the three outcomes, are negative and statistically significant at the 5 percent level or below. As indicated in Section 4.1, the impacts are to be interpreted as relative to the marginal fish farmer with s h approximately equal to zero. In the remaining of the paper we will refer to such differential changes as to "relative income losses".
In regions included in M4, a farmer with the median pre-shock share suffered a 6.2 percent relative income loss. A farmer with an average pre-shock share is predicted to have suffered instead a relative income loss of 11.3 percent. The relative losses for a high-exposure farmer are even higher at 16.9 percent. The impact on per capita income is very similar, 6.4, 11.7 and 17.6 percent, respectively. Instead, the impact on net income is slightly larger: 8.1 percent for low-exposure, 14.7 percent for average-exposure, and 21.7 percent for high-exposure.
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When the Mekong M6 sample is used instead, the impact on each outcome is smaller. This was to be expected, because farmers in the two new provinces included in M6 are less specialized in catfish and there is therefore less overall exposure to the shock. Total income 18 While these differences are not statistically significant, we explore adjustments in input use below. suffers relative declines of 4.7 percent for low-exposure farmers, 9.1 percent for the average farmer, and 13.9 percent for highly-exposed farmers. The relative per capita income losses are equal to 4.8, 9.4 and 14.3 percent, for low-, average-, and high-exposure households, respectively. Finally, the relative declines in net income are 6.2, 12.0, and 18.3 percent for the three exposure levels.
The semi-parametric estimates of g(·) are reported in Panel B).
19 Results are similar to those from the quadratic model. For instance, in Mekong 4 (M4), the impact on total household income change is 6.8, 12.4, and 17.9 percent, at low-, mean-and high-exposure respectively. In Mekong 6 (M6), the corresponding figures are 4.7, 9.7, and 15.2 percent.
The estimated impact on the rate of growth of per capita and net income is also similar to the quadratic specification.
We next use our semi-parametric estimates to plot the overall shape of the function g(·).
This reveals the different impact for households across all (relevant) catfish shares. The results are in Figure 5 . Panel A) shows estimates for total income, Panel B) for per capita income, and Panel C) for net income. For each of these three income outcomes, the graph on the left is the estimate for the M4 sample while the one on the right refers to the M6 sample.
Consistent with the estimates reported above, the shape of the function g is non-linear and well approximated by a quadratic model.
Discussion and False Experiments
Our identification strategy assumes that, conditional on all other regressors, differences Additional evidence in support of our empirical strategy can be provided by performing a falsification experiment. If our identifying assumption holds, we should not observe any such impact for fishing households in non-Mekong regions. Based on the historical differences between North and South Vietnam pointed out before, the best candidates for this false experiment are the non-Mekong provinces of South Vietnam. We then estimate model (6) using the sample of fishing households in these areas, and using the same outcomes as in Table 5 . The results, displayed in Table 6 , show that in this sample, for all outcomes and for all levels of exposure, there is no evidence that the pre-AD shares are associated to the magnitude of the income change. Indeed all estimated coefficients are not only statistically not significant but also positive. We conclude that this falsification experiment helps validate our empirical strategy.
Even so, our estimates require to be further qualified. The estimates reflect the impact of the anti-dumping after allowing for different economy-wide responses to the shock. One important such response is trade deflection, that is, the shift of exports to other non-U.S. 
Household Adjustments: Exit from Catfish Farming
While households could adjust to the U.S. catfish anti-dumping in many different ways, here we only focus on patterns of adjustment in the generation of income. To begin, we first examine the dynamics out of catfish aquaculture by documenting whether households abandoned catfish farming, either partially or totally. In Table 4 , we showed that the unconditional mean share of catfish in the M4 sample dropped from 11.2 percent in 2002 to 6.8 percent in 2004, a sharp decline of around 40 percent. The catfish income shares in the M6 sample dropped from 9.6 to 6.5, a smaller but still significant decline. Overall, there is evidence of a large decline in the share of income from raising catfish in the Mekong after the U.S. anti-dumping.
To investigate whether the pattern of switching out of aquaculture depends on the level of exposure, we run a regression model like (6) with catfish shares as the dependent variable (the right hand side of the model is the same as before). Results are in columns (1) and (2) of Table 7 for samples M4 and M6. We find a statistically significant decline in the share of catfish income at all levels of exposure. In M4, for instance, the drop in catfish income shares for low-exposure farmers is −0.018, which is equivalent to 33 percent of the sample.
The estimated drop in catfish shares is consistent with switching out of aquaculture.
But it may also be simply the consequence of the decline in catfish prices, regardless of whether households actually switched resources towards other economic activities. 23 To further explore the pattern of switching, we now study if the AD tariffs actually led to full exit from catfish production.
The data show substantial exit from fish farming. (3) and (4) of Table 7 . The pattern of full exit is negatively related to the initial shares, that is, smaller farmers are more likely to abandon all catfish activities than larger farmers. For instance, in sample M4, the probability of exit of the median farmer is 23.4, while it is 19.3 percent for the average farmer and 14.7 percent for high-exposure farmers.
Similar patterns emerge in M6. Overall, these findings are consistent with a scenario in which it is easier for farmers who are relatively less involved in catfish farming to exit, even though exit is also observed among households with large values of s h .
Given this decline in catfish shares, we now look at the changes in income shares from other economic activities among catfish households in our sample. We are interested in the response of other aquaculture activities and other major activities such as agriculture and wage labor (see Table 4 in section 3). For this purpose, we estimate model (6) using changes in different income shares as the dependent variable. While part of the estimated adjustment is just a mechanical response of the computation of the shares (if the share of catfish declines, then other shares will necessarily increase), the analysis can reveal interesting compositional changes in income shares.
We report the results in Table 8 . The response of the share of income from other aquaculture activities is negative at all levels of exposure, but it is never statistically significant and it is always very small (columns 1 and 2). This is perhaps not surprising,
given that in both M4 and M6, as documented in section 3, fishing activities involve almost exclusively freshwater aquaculture, while the opportunities to switch to shrimp, mollusks, and in general brackish or marine aquaculture, are very limited. The results in columns (3) and (4) indicate that the combined response of wage labor and agricultural activities (including both marketing and home-consumption) is positive and statistically significant at all levels of exposure. Also, note that the estimated adjustment in these income shares closely matches the drop in catfish shares of Table 7 . In columns (5) and (6), we consider adjustment only towards purely market activities like wage labor and sales of agriculture produce. Here, our results show that only medium-to high-exposure farmers are able to adjust to the market.
Smaller farmers tend to retreat more into agriculture for home consumption.
Adjustment Costs and Spillovers
We now explore whether the data reveal patterns of household behavior that are consistent with the existence of adjustment costs and spillovers, as illustrated in Figure 3 . We begin by assessing the response of fishing income: we estimate model (6) using the change in (log) fishing income as the dependent variable. Results are in columns (1) and (2) of Table 9 . The anti-dumping had a large impact on fish income at all levels of exposure and especially for high-exposed farmers. For instance, catfish income suffered a relative drop of 36.7 percent for the median farmer in M4, 57.7 percent for the average farmer, and 74 percent for the high-exposed farmer (the impacts in M6 are 33.8, 56.6 and 73.8 percent respectively).
24
We can use the estimated changes in catfish income to predict the magnitude of the implied change in household income if all other sources of income remained unchanged (that is, if there were no adjustment costs in production or spillovers to other household economic activities). Let total income y h be the sum of catfish income y (1) and (2) of Table 9 by the pre-shock catfish shares, we get potential relative losses in total income y h of 2.0, 6.5 and 14.8 percent for low-, averageand high-exposure farmers. These magnitudes are substantially smaller than the estimated relative losses in total income from Table 5 (equal to 6.2, 11.3, and 16.9 percent for the three levels of exposure). These differences can only be accounted for by changes in other sources of income that are also induced by the AD shock. We test this in columns (3) and (4) of Table 9 . We run our standard regression (model (6)) with the log of total income, net of catfish income, as the dependent variable. We confirm that the AD shock caused relative declines in the rate of growth of non-catfish income equal to 8.7 percent, 14.5 percent and 18.5 percent for low-, average-, and high-exposure catfish farmers. These estimated impacts on non-catfish income caused by the AD provide additional evidence consistent with adjustment costs and intrahousehold spillovers.
To further explore this result, we now ask which non-catfish sources of income were most likely affected by the AD shock. We examine the two major sources of non-catfish income among Mekong farmers revealed in Table 4 : agriculture and wage income, and other sources of income. The results in columns (5) and (6) show no differential impact on wages and agriculture income across exposure levels: all our estimates are positive but not statistically significant. Instead, in columns (7) and (8), we observe a relative decline in the other sources of income. This suggests that while households managed to maintain the income derived from wages and agriculture, they suffered additional relative income losses in other occupations (like livestock or farm services).
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Additional support for the existence of spillovers into activities different from fish farming can be derived from inspecting the impact of the AD shock on input choices, both in aquaculture and in non-aquaculture activities. Results are in Table 10 . First, in columns (1) and (2), we see that investment in catfish aquaculture (that is, all type of expenditures in catfish activities like breeds, fish food, materials, repairs and maintenance and depreciation of fixed assets) suffered significant declines, from 28.3 percent for low-exposure farmers, to 46.4 percent for the average farmer, and to 61.9 percent for high-exposure farmers. The AD shock seemed to have caused households to heavily disinvest in catfish farming, a finding that is consistent with the large relative drop in catfish income reported above. Second, in columns (3) and (4), we see that hours worked for wages did not change. The results in columns (5) and (6) show instead that households more exposed to the shock increased significantly investment in agriculture relative to households only marginally involved in catfish farming. Finally, the last two columns of Table 10 confirm that total non-agricultural investment suffered relative declines.
It should be noted that there are differences in the samples used in different regressions within this section. This is because not all households in the core sample (i.e., the pre-shock aquaculture producers in 2002) report positive amounts for all the dependent variables analyzed in this section. An obvious example is fish income, which is not reported by pre-shock producers who abandoned the market the market before 2004. The differences in sample sizes raise concerns that our inferences from Tables 9 and 10 could be based on potentially non-comparable samples. In the Appendix we carry out a series of robustness checks and we argue that the results are not driven by different samples used in the regressions.
Overall, our results describe a household behavior that is consistent with both adjustments to trade policy (via choice of economic activities, and investment in aquaculture) and with spillovers from the activities directly affected by those policies to other household activities (via adjustments in input choices in non-aquaculture activities or in labor supply).
Conclusions
Following an anti-dumping lawsuit, the United States imposed tariffs on imports of catfish An important feature of our work is that we highlight the existence of adjustments costs in production and of spillovers of the anti-dumping measures into non-catfish household economic activities. First, there is evidence that households abandoned catfish farming and retreated into wage labor and agriculture. Second, households more involved in catfish farming suffered not only relative declines in aquaculture income, but also experienced relatively row rates of growth in non-catfish income, thus suggesting spillovers. Third, while households managed to maintain income from wage labor and agriculture relatively constant, they suffered relative losses in other sources of income (like livestock, silviculture or farm services)-further evidence of spillovers. Finally, households more exposed to the anti-dumping measure saw smaller rates of growth in investment in both catfish and aggregate non-catfish farming, while maintaining hours worked for wages relatively constant and increasing substantially agricultural investment.
Overall, our results make clear that trade policies such as these anti-dumping duties can affect households involved in the economic activities targeted by the interventions in complex ways. For instance, household can adjust to the intervention and, in the process, can incur adjustments costs and face intrahousehold spillovers. Neglecting these adjustments can bias the assessment of trade interventions.
Appendix 1: Definition of Variables
In this Appendix, we briefly describe the main variables used in the text, with an emphasis on the measurement of the different dependent variables.
Table 5:
Total household income: the sum of all sources of income (for home consumption and for sale) from the income modules of the VHLSS, including wages and salaries, agricultural production, livestock, farm services, silviculture, aquaculture, hunting, non-farm activities, and transfers.
Per capita household income: total household income per household member.
Net household income: total household income net of expenditures in inputs used in farm activities (seeds, maintenance, hired labor, depreciation) like agriculture, aquaculture, farm services, silviculture, hunting, and livestock.
2. 3. Table 8 Other aquaculture income: all other sources of income from aquaculture except catfish (shrimp, mollusks, marine aquaculture).
Income from wages and agriculture: the sum of income from these two activities, including own consumption of agriculture and sales of agricultural output.
Income from wages and agriculture sales: the sum of income from these two activities, only including the sales of agricultural output (and thus excluding own consumption).
Table 10
Catfish investment: expenditures in catfish activities, including breeds, fish feed, non-durable items, energy and fuel, small repairs and maintenance, depreciations, rent of land, rent of machinery, hired labor, veterinary services, and interests.
Hours worked off-farm: total number of hours of all household members out of the farm (for a wage or salary). Only reported by those members that earned wage income. Each household member reports his/her hours worked in "the most time consuming activity among wage/salary activities." Since the "industry" categories are aggregates (for instance, all agriculture in condensed into only one code), the measure used in the regression is the total number of hours worked by all members (so that sample sizes become large enough for regression analysis).
Appendix 2: Robustness to Different Samples
In most of the regressions reported in section 4.5, sample sizes change. This is because not all households in the core sample (i.e., the pre-shock aquaculture producers in 2002) report positive numbers for all the variables analyzed. An obvious example is fish income, which is not reported by pre-shock producers that exited the market in 2004. These differences in sample sizes raise concerns that our inferences from Tables 9 and 10 are based on potentially non-comparable samples. We therefore re-estimate the model for changes in income (total, per capita, and net) for the various (selected) sample sizes in Tables 9 and 10 and we compare the results with those for the core sample (from Table 5 ). If these results are similar across samples, then we can claim that our inferences based on the selected samples are unlikely to be driven by the differences among the samples. After performing this exercise, we find in general that the impacts on total income, per capita income and net income are indeed similar for all alternative samples. As an example, we report the results for total income, net of input purchases, in Table 11, for samples varying by sources of income, and Table 12 , for samples reporting various input purchases. Clearly, the impacts on income are very similar across samples, perhaps with the exception of the sample of household reporting income from "wages and agriculture," for which the impacts appear to be somewhat weaker. show the shares of total aquaculture production from freshwater, brackish & marine, and shrimp aquaculture. The last column reports the fraction of total catfish (tra and basa) production from each province in the Mekong region, calculated from data on total production as well as production by province. Provinces for which the fraction is not reported account for 1.6 percent of total production in the Mekong region. Results from the quadratic model at three different levels of exposure measured by the pre-shock catfish shares: the median (low exposure), the mean (average exposure), and the median share for farmers with shares above the mean (high exposure). The false experiments are run on the sample of fishing households in non-Mekong South Vietnam. Robust standard errors within parenthesis. Note: Estimates of income shares for other aquaculture, wages and agricultural income, and wages and agricultural sales. Mekong 4 (M4) and Mekong 6 (M6) refer to two sets of Mekong provinces that specialize in catfish production: M4 includes An Giang, Can Tho, Dong Thap and Vinh Long, and M6 adds Soc Trang and Tien Giang. Robust standard errors within parenthesis: * , * * , * * * , significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Table 9 Average Impact of Anti-Dumping on Income Sources Mekong Provinces Note: Estimates of income sources: catfish income, non-catfish income, wages and agriculture, other sources of income (livestock, silviculture, farm services). Mekong 4 (M4) and Mekong 6 (M6) refer to two sets of Mekong provinces that specialize in catfish production: M4 includes An Giang, Can Tho, Dong Thap and Vinh Long, and M6 adds Soc Trang and Tien Giang. Robust standard errors within parenthesis: * , * * , * * * , significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Table 10 Average Robust standard errors within parenthesis: * , * * , * * * , significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Table 11 Impacts on Net Income Alternative Samples Tien Giang. Robust standard errors within parenthesis: * , * * , * * * , significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Table 12 Impacts Robust standard errors within parenthesis: * , * * , * * * , significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
